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What Music Isn’t and How to Teach It 
 
Introduction1 
Unlike the other arts, music has no direct connection with the rest of the human world. True, 
there are bird songs and natural “melodies” in the gurgling of brooks, but these are hardly the 
materials of music in the way that landscape can be the subject-matter of painting or the human body 
the material of dance.  And no natural sounds can stand alone as quasi-artworks the way that the 
deeply eroded limestone blocks from China’s Lake Tai can be admired as abstract sculptures.  Music 
demands to be understood on its own terms.  This is not a new requirement, for others, from 
Hanslick to Copland, have urged us to focus on music as experience that is intrinsically and only 
musical.  Still, false analogies are convenient, none more so than the platitude, “Music is the language 
of emotion.”  Music as emotion that is linguistically structured!   What happened to music as its own 
intrinsic, full experience—auditory, somatic, multi-sensory, sensible experience?   
What music isn’t 
Let me start by dispelling the characterization of music as language.  The basis for the 
comparison is simple and obvious.  Both music and language have a formal structure, a syntactic 
structure of units whose order is guided by rules and an overall structure that observes certain formal 
requirements.  Just as words can be combined into phrases, phrases into sentences, sentences into 
paragraphs, and paragraphs into written compositions, so musical tones can be shaped into motives 
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and phrases, phrases into periods, and these into sections that are ordered depending on the larger 
formal structure that has been chosen:  sonata-allegro, rondo, theme and variations, etc.  And since 
sentences and their combinations are presumably the bearer of meaning, so musical meaning is 
likewise assumed to be embedded in music’s formal structures.  
Simple, yes, but not so simple, for problems remain.  Apart from the fact that the logic of 
analogy has merely suggestive force of, there is the specific problem of syntactic meaning.  At best, 
analogies can be illuminating in the parallel they offer.  That is the extent of their logical force:  not 
proof but suggestion.  The question of meaning is a question of a different order.  What kind of 
meaning resides in linguistic formations and what kind in music?  This is no simple question because 
many different kinds of meaning have been attributed to language.  Linguistic syntax follows certain 
well-understood rules germane to a particular language, and governs the relation of subject and 
predicate, the modifying function of adjectives and adverbs, the relational function of clauses and 
phrases, and the order in which all these must be presented.  The established use of these conveys 
assertions, questions, exclamations, and the like.   
Eighteenth and nineteenth century Western music does exhibit syntactic and formal patterns, 
but these are followed loosely and are often deliberately breached.  In fact, strict conventionality in 
music such that everything is predictable is the key to colossal boredom.  In the classical canon, 
phrase length often deviates from pairs of four measures each, harmonic surprises regularly occur in 
the expected chord progressions of cadences, meters shift from simple to compound, key changes 
may be unexpected and abrupt, and so on.  The music of Haydn, for example, is a treasure trove of 
ingenious deviations from the expected, and by the early twentieth century, the desire for refreshing 
musical experience led to much innovation and experimentation, from Richard Strauss’s distinctive 





any sense of tonality, to Arnold Schönberg’s deliberate obliteration of any vestige of tonality 
whatsoever.  While breaking with grammatical conventions in language at the very least obscures 
meaning and often renders it incoherent, formal innovation has the effect of stimulating and 
invigorating musical experience. 
When the language in question is prose non-fiction, we may confidently say that we can locate 
cognitive meaning in the sense of verifiable propositions.  At the same time, it is often acknowledged 
that cognitive meaning does not exhaust the meaning content of literary compositions.  Even in the 
non-poetic use of language, there may be inuendos and other such subtle and indirect shades of 
meaning that may not even be capable of articulation but reside in the choice of particular words and 
their order, not to mention the use of tropes and the extra-linguistic features of spoken language, such 
as gestures and inflection.  Poetic language poses its own challenges to meaning and, of course, the 
meaning of meaning is a major question in linguistics. 
The kind of meaning that inheres in prose fiction is an issue aestheticians continue to debate.  
One can even ask whether the question of meaning is the appropriate question to ask in 
understanding fiction.  And of course this still says nothing about other uses of language, such as in 
poetry and rhetoric.  Questions of meaning are problematic enough in the language arts where they 
might be considered more germane to the medium.  In the case of music, an analogy with language 
raises more difficulties than it dispels and, indeed, dispels none, for I think that it starts the inquiry on 
the wrong track and is thus instantly misleading. 
To bring the matter of meaning into music is, I think, to acknowledge the importance of 
musical experience.  It recognizes that music is not always delectation and that some music affects us 
profoundly.  The question at issue is how to account for its force.  The usual, trite answer is to appeal 





of music has long been understood.  Even though Plato admitted its usefulness in education, he 
found it a troublesome factor in a well-ordered state.  Music’s social utility continues to be exploited 
in martial and patriotic music and in sacred music, both functions effectively combined in national 
anthems.  Even music’s palliative effects have their utility for retail merchandising and customer 
management in the ubiquitous canned music in supermarkets to doctors’ offices.    
Emotion is often cited as the answer to musical meaning.  That music has emotional power 
says more about music than it does about emotion, for we are still left with the question of what 
emotion is.  Here we encounter still more difficulties.  It is hard to take issue with the claim that we 
may have emotions while listening to music.  Yet emotion is not the only feeling we may have:  We 
may feel languorous, erotic, resolute, energetic, or belligerent, all states of body-mind and not what is 
generally meant by what are called emotions such as happy or sad, the usual candidates for music. 
Obviously the explanation of emotion is itself greatly problematic.  Without expecting to 
resolve the not-so-simple question of what emotion is, we can still point out that the word is a short-
hand term for an inchoate experience whose manifestations are invariably unique and hence not 
repeatable, exchangeable, comparable, or even classifiable by any but the most insipid categories.  The 
common words we use to identify emotions, such as ‘happy’ and ‘sad,’ are impoverished, high-order 
abstractions and clarify little about such experiences beyond offering a conventional, vapid 
classification.  
Discussions that attempt to relate music and emotion incur underlying assumptions that 
further vitiate their arguments.  The assumptions are many, beginning with the idea that there is an 
identifiable something called emotion that is present in music.  This is clearly an anthropomorphic 
projection and leads to claims that music expresses something apart from what it itself is.  Music is 





further, these supposed expressions are the right way to talk about what is going on in the music.   
This way of internalizing musical experience is part of the irrepressible tendency to psychologize 
emotion and so to characterize musical experience as subjective.  On the other hand, as long ago as 
the late nineteenth century, psychologists began to credit emotions to physiological changes 
emanating from the autonomic nervous system (the James-Lange theory of emotions), while more 
recent theories find emotions resulting from physiological arousal joined with cognitive factors such 
as an appraisal of the surroundings (Schachter and Singer's two-factor theory of emotion).  The 
tendency to translate aesthetic experience into emotion is prevalent in the common misunderstanding 
of the arts in general but even more pernicious in the case of music, which has nothing external on 
which to pin it, as painting has to the landscape or the novel to a plot.   
Because it is common for people to experience emotion when listening to music, the 
assumption is made that music is emotion or is about emotion.  An insidious logical error often seeps 
through discussions associating music and emotion.  The error consists in taking the effect, emotion, 
for the explanation.  This is a type of common pre-scientific explanation of phenomena that occurs 
when the effect is taken as the cause, as in claiming, to use one of John Dewey’s examples, that the 
heat in fire is caused by fire’s calorific power.  This is a false explanation or, rather, a non-explanation, 
since it is merely a tautology; that is, it “explains” something by merely citing itself in different words.  
In this example, ‘calorific’ means “productive of heat,” thus the so-called explanation only says that 
the heat in fire is caused by the power to produce heat!  This is a kind of thinking still prevalent in 
social thought, as when selfish behavior is explained by saying that it’s human nature to be selfish.  In 
other words, people are selfish because people are selfish!  So from the fact that people have an 
emotional response to music, the inference is made that music originates in feeling or, in Langer’s 





But let us consider how we experience music.  Sound is produced, usually from an external 
source except, of course, in the case of vocal sounds.  It is activated by a person or device usually 
different from the listener and, when physical or electronic equipment is involved, often separate in 
time as well as space.  The sounds themselves are physical events in the form of atmospheric 
vibrations.  It is unnecessary here to enumerate the multiple factors involved in the production of 
music, but it is useful to remember them when confronted by the many commonplaces that try to 
turn music into a personal, private, inner, subjective emotion. Such accounts fail to recognize that 
music is not only a physical occurrence but a social phenomenon involving a community of 
composers, performers, and listeners and that it has a history of performance practice and of valuing.  
Listening to music incorporates (I use this word literally) all the factors I have listed, and 
considering music in this way makes it into a physical, social, situational, and even historical art.  The 
listener’s participation in the perception of sound is physiological social psychological, as if any of 
these could be separated. “[T]he social mind (Mead, Dewey, Peirce) always conditions perception 
selectively – it doesn’t just automatically register stimuli.”2   Much more could be said on the subject 
but what I have offered is enough to situate and correct the bald misunderstanding that is assumed in 
regarding musical experience as a subjective and emotional experience.  Music could better be 
described as a social-environmental art.  Of course such an account does not fully answer the question 
of what musical experience is but it sets us in the right direction.  More on this question in a moment. 
A corollary to the error of assigning music an emotional meaning lies in maintaining that 
music expresses that emotion.  In its naïve use this mistaken insistence projects the human capacity to 
                                                 







feel and express emotion into the musical sounds themselves.  A more sophisticated version argues 
that the expression is in the music or that music has expressive properties.  Apart from the 
anthropomorphism implicit in such assertions, the very language reifies emotive phenomena that are 
fluid and intangible.  In one way or another, music is taken to express emotion.   
It  is undoubtedly true for most people, musicians and non-musicians alike, that listening to 
music may evoke experience replete with feelings.  What, then, is the relation between those feelings 
and the music?   Often a parallelism and perhaps even an identity is proposed between the listener’s 
emotional experience and the emotion the music is purportedly expressing.  But it is hard to grasp in 
any but the vaguest sense how a feeling, itself elusive and indeterminate, can be compared with or be 
assimilated to another, equally indeterminate feeling.  Other difficulties emerge when attempting to 
distinguish components in emotion:  a cognitive object, a physiological state, and the corresponding 
expressive behavior.  When the fact that one has feelings while listening to music is used to claim that 
the music is expressing those feelings, what we have is more likely a projection of the listener’s 
experience onto the music itself than anything in or true of the music. Stravinsky excised this issue 
neatly when he commented, “Music expresses nothing.  It can express itself only.”3 
Much of the difficulty here stems from the common connotation of the very word ‘music.’  
The term is usually taken to mean that there is some thing, an auditory event called ‘music.’ In fact, the 
word music is actually a shorthand way of speaking of an entire experiential situation.  Understood 
purely as sound, the word ‘music’ is a synecdoche, taking a part of the entire auditory situational 
experience as if it were the whole.  “Music itself” is thus synecdochic, since musical sound is 
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inseparable from an agent who produces and one who hears it. (Obviously they may be the same 
individual.) Moreover, whatever emotion we feel in listening to music is culturally conditioned; it is 
not found in the music but is, at best, projected onto it.   
All such misleading assertions could be avoided by recognizing that music is the human 
experience of certain sonorous phenomena.  And any emotional expression that might be claimed of 
it occurs in the experience of those phenomena but resides neither in the sounds alone nor in the 
listeners themselves.  Indeed, ‘expression’ is hardly the appropriate word to account for such 
experience.  For, whatever else may be said – and this is of central importance -- it is experience 
whose focus is on its very self as experience, not on the listener’s interior feelings or response, which 
is what is implied by ‘expression.’  Indeed, experience is badly misconstrued if it is taken as subjective.  
As I hope to have made clear, experience in general and musical experience in particular is a complex 
phenomenon involving a number of factors, events, and collaborating conditions.  Language, 
emotion, and expression are poor, misleading surrogates for that experience.4                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Once these misrepresentations have been avoided, it is still no easy task to give an authentic 
account of musical experience.  But at the same time, such experience should stand at the very center 
of music education, and something must be said and done about it.  For unless we consider music 
education to consist entirely of technical, theoretical, or historical information, we must necessarily 
                                                 
4  It is indeed difficult to avoid thinking of music in terms that do not rely on or recall emotions.  Undoubtedly music has a 
powerful psychic effect and evokes responses that may be emotionally powerful.  I take no issue with this.  The danger, 
however, lies in attributing this capacity to the music itself and in failing to keep the emotional factor where it resides, that is 
in the experience of the listener and performer and not in the music.  Despite all his efforts to keep music “pure” and distinct 
from all extraneous features, even Peter Kivy eventually succumbs to the force of the emotional explanation.  See his Music 






turn to the ways music may be experienced.  Theory, history, and analysis are not substitutes for or 
alternatives to musical experience but must derive from and can enhance that experience.  
Understanding better what that experience is and what it involves is necessary before determining 
what and how to teach music. 
What can we teach? 
Having said what music isn’t, we are left with the task of how to teach it.  And since all we 
have are musical experiences, socially and culturally situated, and nothing else, what can we teach?  
Without language or emotion to rest on, is there anything we can say about music?  All we can talk 
about is musical sound in its many modes and styles and with its indefinite boundaries. Can we teach 
experience?  Not an easy undertaking. 
Early in the process of music education must come re-education:  the task of dispelling 
pernicious misapprehensions of the sort I have been describing.  But once we expose their seductive 
misdirections, a rich and complex range of experience lies before us.  We can encourage and lead 
others first to focus on musical experience directly and without intermediary and to recognize its 
many dimensions and transformations.  Then we can assist them in developing skill in engaging in the 
experience.   
Let me offer some suggestions on how to structure and direct this process. What I propose 
here is hardly new, but I hope that, in its present context, these ideas may serve to help others engage 
with music on its own terms more directly and with greater satisfaction and fulfillment.  The key is to 
attract and hold attention on musical experience itself by exposing students to the many ways by 
which musical sounds are shaped, organized, and developed so that they experience them and begin 
to recognize their nuances and transformations.  How to do this? 





effective way of encouraging participation in musical experience.5  One can be taught to feel physically 
the pulse of different meters such as the common  2/4, 3/4,  4/4, 6/8 and to experience how they are 
embedded in musical forms, such as the waltz, mazurka, polka, tarantella, and march.  Engaging in 
such experiences would transform these forms from conceptual distinctions into physical events with 
distinctively different experiential (metrical and physical) characters.  Actually learning to dance in 
these different meters is an excellent corrective to subjectifying or abstracting their distinctive 
identities. Moreover, translating into bodily movements such musical devices as the anticipation, 
suspension, the resolution of a dissonance, and the pedal tone, and the persistent repetition of a 
rhythmic pattern or melodic motive, as in Ravel’s Bolero, the Allegretto second movement of 
Beethoven’s Seventh Symphony, or a distinctive rhythm, such as the Scotch snap, can help make them 
concrete.  An inventive instructor could even choreograph some musical works as movement alone. 
Other dimensions of education in musical experience include dynamic properties, melodic 
understanding, harmonic structure and movement, and musical form.  Here a talented instructor can 
find illustrative materials and help students learn to hear and detect perceptual differences.  Included 
among the dynamic properties of music are volume, intensity, and changes in volume and tempo, sensing 
melodic intervals and harmonic textures, and noticing the movement of pitch.  Differences in texture 
can easily be illustrated by the dense chords frequently found in Beethoven’s piano works, the thin, 
diaphanous sound at the beginning of the Intermezzo in Cavalleria Rusticana, and the wide spatial texture 
of the opening of the Sibelius Violin Concerto, my favorite example of musical spatiality.   
                                                 
5  In writing of vocal music, Barthes emphasizes the participation of the body, and he finds this in other musical genres, both 
in the performer and the listener:  “The ‘grain’ is the body in the voice as it sings, the hand as it writes, the limb as it 






Detecting the movement of pitch is probably one of the easiest perceptual changes to convey, 
shifts from low to high and the contrast between simple lines and florid passages.  This can lead 
eventually to skill in following polyphonic textures and apprehending contrapuntal techniques. 
Repetitive patterns could be a part of developing pitch awareness, leading perhaps to the capacity to 
recognize melodic repetition in a ground bass and in sets of themes and variations. Examples of 
masterful jazz improvisation can be studied to illustrate pitch variation.  Such changes could be 
combined in different ways to further develop perceptual acuteness.    
Less obvious but just as revealing are harmonic movement, such as the different effects of typical 
harmonic progressions. Cultivating this sensibility may be more difficult for those without musical 
training but I think an elementary capacity to notice such changes can be developed.  One could start 
with examples of harmonic movement in works built primarily of chord repetition and sequences, 
such as the melodic and harmonic repetition of E-flat at the beginning of Chopin’s Etude op. 25 no. 1 
(“Aeolian Harp”) and the widely familiar harmonic sequence of Bach’s Prelude in C major, Well-
Tempered Clavier Bk. I, No. 1.  Grasping harmonic patterns and movement can lead students eventually 
to the chaconne and passacaglia. 
Finally, perceiving musical forms requires greater perceptual sophistication but there are simple 
levels of apprehending musical structure by noticing dramatic changes within a movement, such as the 
Intermezzo Interotto in the fourth movement of Bartók’s Concerto for Orchestra, and the chorale Es ist genug 
quoted in the last movement of Berg’s Violin Concerto.  Recognizing the repetition of a section in 
baroque binary form and in Schubert’s Moments musicaux requires somewhat more skill.  Noticing the 
contrast between movements of larger works might lead eventually to recognizing the prospective 
termination that identifies a coda.  Students could be led from noticing the contrasting character of 





part song form, the rondo, and the recapitulation in a sonata-allegro movement.  
It is tempting to begin the process of leading students to musical experience by recourse to 
the imitative use of music, something that occurs in many musical genres:  classical, folk, rock, jazz, and 
pop.  Although this actively encourages the listener to attend to the ongoing sounds and to relate 
them imaginatively to what descriptive source the composer has used as a stimulus to musical 
imagination, it actually can subvert our intent, for it can easily lead the listener to substitute a cognitive 
experience for a musical one by focusing on a narrative and trying to identify sounds by the non-
musical features or events they purportedly represent. 
The temptation to have recourse to imitation is great.  Many avid listeners were first 
captivated by the ability of music to represent stories in sound in such works as Camille Saint-Saëns’s 
Danse macabre, Paul Dukas’s The Sorcerer’s Apprentice, and especially that classic of fairy tale narrative, 
Prokofiev’s Peter and the Wolf.  The traits of people, things, and situations can be rendered in sounds 
that are easy to recognize, as Mussorgsky revealed so ingeniously in Pictures at an Exhibition.  Debussy’s 
music exhibits many descriptive opportunities, from the more obvious (“The Sunken Cathedral”) to 
the less obvious (“Goldfish” and “Gardens in the Rain”).  These could be followed by descriptive 
music that requires more abstract imagination to grasp, such as Debussy’s La Mer and Mussorgsky’s 
Night on Bald Mountain.  Examples of this sort can be varied with works that use or imitate sounds that 
normally occur outside of music, such as bird song (Beethoven’s Pastoral Symphony), a locomotive 
(Honegger’s Pacific 231), and traffic (Gershwin’s An American in Paris). Similar imitative sounds occur 
in the works by Debussy and Saint-Saëns mentioned earlier.  If imitation is used, however, it is 
important to make clear that the sounds are suggestive and evocative only and that they do not get 





that no sharp boundary can be drawn between musical and non-musical sounds.6 
These examples are only illustrative and reflect my interest in the classical repertory, but there 
is no end of examples available in other genres, and imaginative instructors may enjoy finding 
illustrations from folk music, jazz, pop, and other genres of musical literature.  Developing and 
refining an informal curriculum in musical listening could easily become an exciting pedagogical 
project with a personal stamp, for interests and knowledge of the musical literature are invariably 
individual. And getting students to supply examples would serve a double purpose.  
We end, then, with music, only with music, with musical experience.7  But that is precisely 
where we should begin if we wish to avoid characterizing music by what it isn’t.  Let me conclude this 
section by contradicting the title of this essay and urge that we resolve to speak only of what music is. 
Music as an environmental art 
 How, then, are we to understand music?  How can we understand music in its own terms?  
The question has often been asked, especially since Hanslick and still debated.8 Let me approach the 
question indirectly by locating music rather than by describing it, as I have just done here, or by 
speaking of its manifestations and workings as in composing and performing music.  We can do this 
by thinking of music as an environmental art, not by referring to environmental music or to music in 
                                                 
6   See the preceding essay, “What Titles Don’t Tell.” 
7  “The purer the music the less it should be possible to know it.  Knowledge re-establishes a relation with Having, 
nonidentity, which precisely music wants to overcome.  The realm of perfect music would be the realm of unknowing but 
also of the fullness of Being.”  Peter Widmer, “Orpheus und Euridice,” in Die Lust am Verbotenen und die Notwendigkeit Grenzen 
zu überschreiten (Zürich: Kreuz Verlag, 1991), pp. 148-53, trans. and reprinted in Lacan, Politics, Aesthetics, ed. W. Apollon and R. 
Feldstein (Albany:  SUNY Press, 1996), p. 300.  
8  Eduard Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, A Contribution toward the Revision of the Aesthetics of Music, trans. G. Payzant 





environment but of environment as a way of characterizing musical experience. 
First let me say that music does not exist in the abstract.  Indeed, it is perhaps the most 
concrete, present, site-specific art.  That is, music occurs; it occurs in space-time.  Its direct 
manifestation is immediate, and as an event it is always contextual, in other words, environmental.  
Scholars have engaged in interminable debates over what constitutes the musical object:  the 
ephemeral sound, the score, performance tradition, and the like.  But I think the question is misstated, 
for there is no musical object; there is no aesthetic object; there is no object as such.  To speak in this 
fashion is to offer an abstraction in place of an experience, to hypostatize the experience.  
Furthermore, the tendency, indeed the implication in introducing the idea of a musical object (or any 
object, for that matter) is that there is some thing out there, independent of us, to be located and 
identified, some thing separate and apart that needs to be understood.   
But music is not an object, just as environment is not a place, separate from ourselves.  
Indeed, the common notion of environment as outside, as surroundings, involves the same 
objectifying process as in taking music as an object.  I have long been trying to explain environment as 
a contextual field that includes the human participant, not as a separate part but as an integral factor.9  
Similarly, as participants in musical experience, we become part of the music or, to speak more 
precisely, we are participants and, as we engage in the musical process we contribute a creative 
function.    
We can, in fact, think of the musical environment as a perceptual field, an aesthetic field in 
                                                 
 
9  Arnold Berleant, The Aesthetics of Environment (Philadelphia:  Temple University Press, 1992), Living in the Landscape:  Toward 
an Aesthetics of Environment (Lawrence:  University Press of Kansas, 1997), and Aesthetics and Environment, Variations on a Theme 






which the various functions in appreciation are carried out.  Four principal factors function in the 
musical situation or field:   The creative one is, of course, the activity of the composer in shaping the 
(primarily) auditory experience.  This may be focused in a musical score, a plan for listening that has 
been created by the composer.  Or it may be in the sound itself, played or recorded directly using 
electronic technology.  And for music to be heard it must be performed or activated at some time and 
in some way, so a performative factor accompanies the creative and focusing ones.10  A fourth factor 
is active listening, so involved that fulfills the auditory possibilities the composer has embedded in the 
musical score or in the actual sound, and their realization by the performer.  This is the process of 
appreciation.   
These four functions – the creative, the focused, the performative, and the appreciative are 
factors in every situation in which musical appreciation is fulfilled.  These functions must not be 
thought of separately.  Each involves and requires the others, and all of them together constitute an 
aesthetic field, a musical situation, a musical environment.11  What makes such  a situation aesthetic is 
that it centers around appreciative experience that is primarily perceptual, involving all the senses, not 
only the auditory one, mediated and shaped through the manifold of cultural factors that affect all 
perception, and valued principally in itself for its own sake.  To call a situation aesthetic thus identifies 
the kind of complex normative experience we engage in, here with music, elsewhere with other arts, 
and still elsewhere in other domains of experience. 
                                                 
10  One could speak of focusing as an objectifying factor, referring to the musical work that is created.  But this way of 
speaking encourages one to slip into the mistake of thinking of a musical object, a misunderstanding that must be carefully 
avoided. 
 11 See Arnold Berleant, The Aesthetic Field:  A Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience (Springfield, Ill.:  C. C. Thomas l970). 






Perhaps we can teach students to engage in appreciative listening in this way so that their 
aesthetic engagement involves the conscious participation in this fourfold process of creating, 
focusing, performing, and appreciating.  For this to be possible they must learn to listen to and 
participate in the maneuverings of sounds, and this is both a challenge and a discovery for both 
teacher and students. 
 
